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A link between populism and social media is often suspected. This paper spells out a set of 
possible mechanisms underpinning this link: that social media changes the communication 
structure of the public sphere, making it harder for citizens to obtain evidence that refutes 
populist assumptions. By developing a model of the public sphere, four core functions of the 
public sphere are identified: exposing citizens to diverse information, promoting equality of 
deliberative opportunity, creating deliberative transparency, and producing common knowledge. 
A well-working public sphere allows citizens to learn that there are genuine disagreements 
among citizens that are held in good faith. Social media makes it harder to gain this insight, 
opening the door for populist ideology.  
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Introduction 
It is often suspected that there is a link between the rise of populism and the 
increased use of social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. In this 
paper, I aim to show that there likely is such a link, but that the mechanism 
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underpinning this link can only be understood if we think more carefully about an 
important but somewhat neglected topic in political theory: the public sphere. 
What makes social media conducive to the populist agenda, I will argue, is the 
way social media has restructured the functioning of the public sphere and the 
way citizens relate to each other in the public sphere. This is a bold claim and I 
cannot hope to defend all aspects of it in this short, programmatic article. Instead, 
I will provide a roadmap of how such an argument needs to unfold, with many 
details needing to be filled in later. 
One might think that political theory would have a detailed understanding of 
what the public sphere is and how it ought to be organized. There are two strands 
of literature that speak to this question, but only indirectly: On the one hand, the 
literature on public reason investigates which reasons can count as public in a 
liberal state (e.g., Quong, 2018). On the other hand, the literature on deliberative 
democracy argues for an ideal of democracy based on the free exchange of 
arguments (e.g., Bächtiger et al., 2018). Both literatures fulfil important roles, but 
they do not answer the set of questions I’m interested in, such as: (i) Who should 
be allowed to speak in the public sphere?; (ii) Is there an obligation to hear 
everyone?; (iii) Is there a right to listen to all conversations in the public sphere?; 
(iv) Does it undermine the functioning of the public sphere if participants can 
hide the fact that they have been talking? 
I therefore suggest that, in order to investigate and critically analyse the 
transition of public communication structures due to social networking sites like 
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Facebook or Twitter, we need better normative theories of the public sphere. 
None of the existing theories give us a good sense what, if anything, is bad about 
having our public sphere transferred to communication structures that, it will 
turn out, are quite different from our traditional understanding of the public 
sphere. To get a sense of what is happening to our democracies with the advent of 
social media, we need to explain much better how the public sphere ought to 
function as a venue and as a network. 
The current public debate is awash with theories about ‘echo chambers’, ‘filter 
bubbles’, data privacy scandals, digital profiling, concerns about targeted political 
campaigning, and so on. All these debates are important and require urgent 
empirical and theoretical attention, ideally beyond the breathless news coverage. 
For political theorists, however, it is important to step back and think about the 
larger, structural issues that arise from the widespread use of social networking 
sites and messaging apps (‘social media’, for short). And the structural change we 
are seeing right now is that social media transforms the communication 
structures in which political deliberation takes place. Or, to put it differently, 
social media changes how the public sphere functions. 
This paper tackles the issue with a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, I 
develop a simple model of the public sphere to unveil idealized structural 
features and to obtain more clarity about the normative ideals that guide the 
public sphere or are promoted by a well-working public sphere. On the other 
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hand, I will investigate what populism is and how it benefits from the 
restructuring of the public sphere I have alluded to above.  
While I believe that this strategy holds promise, it also has a cost: the idealized 
model of the public sphere is not a model of any actual public sphere – it is not an 
empirical model. In particular, it does not offer an account of the public sphere 
prior to the emergence of social media. Because I do not develop a theory of the 
pre-social-media public sphere dominated by mass media, I am not in a position 
to show that the pre-social-media public sphere fulfils its core functions better 
than the social media public sphere (and it might be too early to make such 
general comparisons anyhow). The ambition of this paper is much more modest: 
the idealized public sphere model shows us some distinct drawbacks and dangers 
of a public sphere conducted on social media communication structures. Whether 
these drawbacks and dangers are more or less worrying than those of a public 
sphere shaped by traditional mass media is not a question I intend to answer 
here. 
I begin with a brief discussion of populism. I then develop a basic normative 
model of the public sphere and uncover functions of the public sphere based on 
that model. The following section analyses the effects of social media on the 
public sphere. The paper returns to the issue of populism in the penultimate 
section, showing why the recent restructuring of the public sphere through social 




According to Müller’s influential theory of populism, the best way to capture the 
phenomenon is to focus on the core tenets of this ideology: 
‘Populism, I suggest, is a particular moralistic imagination of politics, a 
way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally pure and fully 
unified – but, I shall argue, ultimately fictional – people against elites 
who are deemed corrupt or in some other way morally inferior. It is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition to be critical of elites in order to 
qualify as a populist. Otherwise, anyone criticizing the powerful and the 
status quo in any country would by definition be a populist. In addition 
to being antielitist, populists are always antipluralist: populists claim 
that they, and only they, represent the people.’ (Müller, 2016: 16, 
footnotes omitted) 
This approach, which shares many similarities with Mudde and Kaltwasser’s 
‘ideational’ definition (2017), identifies two markers of populism that are jointly 
necessary and sufficient, namely anti-elitism and anti-pluralism. Anti-elitism is a 
worldview that characterizes all politics as a conflict between a large majority of 
virtuous ‘people’ and a much smaller group of morally and otherwise corrupted 
‘elites’. Anti-pluralism is the claim that the will of ‘the people’ is well-defined and 
easy to identify, but is not represented by anyone but the populist. 
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The anti-elitism of the populist suggests that all political life is essentially a 
struggle between an often ‘silent majority’ and a smaller group of ‘elites’, who are 
always described as acting in bad faith, but typically succeed because they are 
more influential and well-versed in the art of political plotting (Kriesi, 2014). This 
set of beliefs is sometimes referred to as the ‘paranoid style’ (Hofstadter, 1967) of 
populists. The anti-pluralism is based on a misguided democratic and social 
choice theory that suggests that the ‘will of the people’ is always well-defined and 
easy to determine (at least for the populist). Within a preference aggregation 
framework, the idea of such a will flies in the face of Arrow’s Impossibility 
theorem and various other impossibility results (List, 2019; Weale, 2019). 
Outside a preference aggregation framework, more plausible interpretations of 
the ‘will of the people’ are available. It could be understood, for example, as a 
group intention that needs to be constructed in deliberation, or it could be based 
on the thought that there are some objective standards of the public interest or of 
good governance that can be tracked. However, even if we think that the notion of 
the ‘will of the people’ can be filled with content and that it can be tracked by 
suitably reliable procedures, there is little reason to believe that the populist is in 
an epistemically superior position to determine what this will is.  
Müller’s definition helps to explain several auxiliary beliefs that populists 
typically hold to stabilize their world view and make it more robust to critical 
scrutiny. Populists often assume that ‘elites’ act in bad faith, which explains why 
they intend to pervert the ‘will of the people’ and why they often succeed. They 
maintain that ‘elites’ conspire against the unsuspecting ‘people’, which explains 
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why the people often do not notice that their will is perverted without the help of 
the populist. They also suggest that the ‘will of the people’ exists and can be 
identified by the populist (though not by his or her opponents), which explains 
why populists can speak with such certainty about the ‘true’ goals of the people. 
Finally, and related to the last point, populists insist that they can act as a savior, 
ensuring that the will of the people is implemented due to the populist’s special 
capacities to uncover the betrayal of the elites and to give a voice to the people, 
which explains why ‘the people’ need a populist to assert their majority interests. 
Populism is, in principle, a world view vulnerable to empirical refutation. Doubts 
could creep in once voters realize that ‘the people’ disagree about choices, that 
the populist politician does not know what ‘the people’ really want, that the 
‘elites’ do not always act in bad faith or do not have the capacity to successfully 
suppress the majority, or that there is no reason to believe that the populist has 
special capacities to enable ‘the people’ to assert their interests. 
The belief that is arguably most difficult to stably instill and maintain among the 
followers of the populist is the idea that ‘the people’ have a ‘will’ that the populist 
can easily identify. The populist interpretation is that everyone who counts as 
‘the people’ agrees on something, or at least would agree on something on 
reflection. How does the populist deal with dissent? One option is to declare that 
dissenters are not the ‘real’ people , another is to suggest that ‘the people’ are 
currently misled or suffer from ‘false consciousness’, but will eventually, with the 
help of the populist, discover their true interests (Müller, 2016: 22). 
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Perhaps the most dangerous political situation for the populist occurs when 
voters come together, realize that they have genuinely different views, in good 
faith, without being misled, and without being able to plausibly dismiss 
dissenters as being captured by elites. These political situations are likely to 
occur when citizens deliberate. Deliberation, especially if there is enough time 
and groups are small, typically reveals significant disagreement, though often also 
a willingness to compromise. It typically does not reveal a ‘will of the people’ – at 
least not in the sense of universal consent. Instead, the compromises that can be 
found require participants to move away from their most preferred option. 
Compromises are also typically more complicated than individual views, partly to 
accommodate different preferences, but partly also because deliberation enables 
citizens to learn about the complexity of a problem and respond to it. 
Deliberation also reveals that most citizens hold their own views in good faith, 
and not because they are misled or deluded. The better the deliberating citizens 
get to know each other, the less plausible the paranoid explanations become. 
Personal deliberation experiences also help to strengthen the trust in 
representative democracy. The populist world-view is anti-representative, 
suggesting that all elected representatives are part of the political elite – apart 
from the populist representatives, of course. In this narrative, populists typically 
point out that representatives disagree with ‘the people’, citing this as evidence 
for their elitism or bad faith. This storyline is much less plausible once citizens 
observe in deliberation that the positions represented by politicians are positions 
held by their fellow citizens, nut just by distant elites. 
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For learning about the different viewpoints represented in society, large 
democracies traditionally turn to the public sphere, a place in which citizens and 
their representatives deliberate. 
The Public Sphere 
In this section I will lay the groundwork by making more precise what the public 
sphere is and how it functions. By creating and analysing a model of the public 
sphere, I uncover central empirical and normative assumptions that often remain 
implicit in the scholarly discussion. 
The Public Sphere in the Literature 
The public sphere is often invoked, but rarely precisely defined.1 Rawls appeals to 
a version of it in The Theory of Justice, but he calls it the public forum: 
‘If the public forum is to be free and open to all, and in continuous 
session, everyone should be able to make use of it’ (Rawls, 1999a: sec. 
36). 
Here Rawls focuses on two central values that ought to be embodied by the public 
sphere: First, all participants ought to relate as equals, regardless of their actual 
wealth, office, or social status. And second, all potential participants have an 
 
1 For an overview, see Gripsrud et al. 2010. 
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opportunity to take part in the activities of the public sphere. Thus, the public 
sphere should be guided by the values of equality and inclusivity. 
Perhaps the early Rawls really did think of the public forum as a place to be used 
by all. The later Rawls, however, is quite explicit in his restrictive view of its 
scope: 
‘This forum may be divided into three parts: the discourse of judges in 
their decisions, and especially the judges of a supreme court; the 
discourse of government officials, especially chief executives and 
legislators; and finally, the discourse of candidates for public offices and 
their campaign managers’ (Rawls, 1999b: 133) 
The culture of civil society, by contrast, Rawls calls the ‘background culture’ 
(Rawls, 1999b: 134). This way of conceptualizing the public sphere leads to a 
narrow understanding of a public to which the norms of public reason apply, and 
a wide understanding of a less regulated civil sphere. 
A broader understanding of the public sphere would be useful to analyse the 
norms of public deliberation beyond courtrooms, parliaments, and election 
campaigns. The first point of call when looking for such an analysis is Jürgen 
Habermas, who, in his complex historical treatment, envisions the public sphere 
as an arena for the public exchange of reasons, guided by the force of better 
arguments, focusing on matters of public interest (Habermas, 1962; 1998). 
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Habermas, like Rawls, emphasizes that the participants should relate as equals.2 
The public sphere should also embody the values of transparency and 
reasonableness. But unlike Rawls, Habermas envisages the public sphere to be 
embedded in civil society, reaching well beyond the formal institutions.3 
Proponents of deliberative democracy tend to agree with the broader 
understanding. Elizabeth Anderson, drawing on J.S. Mill and John Dewey, prefers 
the term ‘civil society’ over ‘public sphere’ and appears to imagine a loser 
connection of different venues for debate. But she alludes to norms that could 
plausibly apply to the public sphere when she writes that ‘citizens learn to treat 
one another as equals: as eligible for inclusion in collective projects, entitled to an 
equal voice, whose concerns merit equal attention and response’ (Anderson, 
2009: 218) 
Appeals to the public sphere often rely on spatial metaphors: the ‘forum’, the 
‘arena’, or ‘the stage’ (cf. Fraser, 1990). Habermas, famously, thought of the public 
sphere in historical terms, as an 18th century bourgeois salon, though – arguably 
– in an idealized fashion, not necessarily an accurate historical representation. 
What is striking here is the focus on small-scale, restricted spaces in which 
deliberation takes place. Many other authors make reference to the ‘agora’ or the 
‘forum’ (see, for instance, Elster, 1986). These are larger, but still geographically 
 
2 For a critique of this idealization, see Fraser 1990. 
3 Habermas was pessimistic about how the public sphere would fare in the age of the mass 
media. See Habermas 2006. 
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circumscribed spaces of public interaction. John Parkinson takes this spatial 
aspect as the crucial element for understanding the functioning of the ‘public 
space’, as he calls it (Parkinson, 2012: 61).4 While I do not pursue the importance 
of literal public space for deliberation in the way Parkinson does, the emphasis on 
access and on common effects will be relevant for my model, too. 
Cass Sunstein, in #Republic, points to the spatial interpretation of the US Supreme 
court’s ‘public forum doctrine’ (Sunstein, 2018: ch. 2). He comes closest to my 
modelling approach when describing the importance of ‘access’ and ‘exposure’ to 
diverse views.  
A Model of the Public Sphere 
To get a tighter grip on the function of the public sphere, it is useful to think about 
its central rules more systematically and provide a functional account. The goal 
here is not to present an accurate picture of how the public sphere works in real 
life. Rather, the point is to take the spatial metaphor seriously to create a model.5 
The model, it will turn out, is useful for deducing normative principles regulating 
the public sphere. 
The model building starts by thinking about the public sphere as a physical space 
with participants talking to each other. They can ‘speak’ or they can ‘listen’ or, 
 
4 Parkinson distinguishes between ‘public sphere’ and the ‘public space’, but in this article I 
use these terms interchangeably. 
5 On the use of models in political theory, see Johnson 2014. 
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more generally, they can ‘send’ and ‘receive’. To get a handle on the function of 
the public sphere, let us begin with a small-scale deliberation in a circumscribed 
space, not unlike the coffeehouses Habermas had in mind. 
There are some basic side constraints for any conversation: To begin with, at any 
specific point in time, one can either speak, or listen to someone who is speaking, 
or do neither (but not speak and listen at the same time). Moreover, at any 
specific point in time, one can only listen to one person. 
Which principles regulate the public sphere? The spatial metaphor provides some 
hints, but very few authors have spelled out the interaction between speakers 
and listeners in detail.6 I suggest six crucial principles of the public sphere to 
regulate speaker-listener relations and their publicity: 
 
6 Some remarks in this direction can be found in Adut 2012. 
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The Principle of Open Access. Each individual can enter and leave the public 
sphere as they choose; 
The Principle of Free Participation. Each individual can, at suitable times, start 
to speak to any person present in the public sphere. At the same time, no one is 
forced to speak; 
 The Principle of Listener Choice. Each person can choose to listen to any 
speaker and, at suitable times, change the person they listen to (but cannot 
normally listen to several speakers at the same time); 
The Principle of Exposure. Each person present in the public sphere may have 
to hear the messages of any others until, at a suitable time, they can choose to 
speak themselves or listen to someone else; 
The Principle of Transparency. Everybody is permitted to observe who talks to 
whom and can easily establish the relevant speaker-listener relations. 
The Principle of Public Sphere Scrutiny. Policies, laws, executive acts, the conduct 
officials and other matters of public interest must be available for scrutiny in the 
public sphere. 
 
Each of these features needs unpacking. 
The Principle of Open Access represents the normative ideal of having a free 
choice over whether one is exposed to the interactions in the public sphere and 
has the opportunity to contribute, or whether one stays away from the 
interaction. The exit option is especially important because it is the only option to 
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ensure that one is not talked to – if one wants to be left alone, one needs to leave 
the public sphere. The option of entry matters because it guarantees that 
everyone who wishes to do so can take part in the deliberations of the public 
sphere. The value underpinning the Principle of Open Access is the freedom to 
associate or not to associate, but also the general negative freedom not to take 
part in non-essential social activities. A society that forced people to show 
constant presence in the public sphere would be, at least in this special aspect, 
totalitarian in the Orwellian sense: it would expose citizens to a potentially 
constant stream of news and views even in what should be moments of privacy, 
solitude, or calm. By contrast, a society that prevented citizens from entering the 
public sphere would be a closed society, perhaps a society controlled by an elite 
or a ruling class that prevents the emergence of an open public sphere. 
The Principle of Free Participation says that every person present in the public 
sphere may, at suitable times, speak to any other person present. The ‘suitable 
time’ caveat takes into account that the speaking acts need to be compossible; 
how this freedom to speak can be exercised depends on whether the targeted 
person is available to listen. If the target person is neither speaking nor listening, 
one can start speaking to the target straight away. If the target person is listening 
to someone else, one can start speaking to the target person once there is a 
chance to interject. The target person will then listen for the moment until she 
can make her own move, i.e. continue to listen, listen to someone else, or start to 
speak to someone. Finally, if the target person is currently speaking, one can 
interject at the next possible moment. The target person will then listen, but can, 
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at the next opportunity, interrupt the new speaker and start speaking again, or 
they can choose to continue to listen. The Principle of Free Participation grows out 
of the freedom to express oneself but also the democratic rights of citizens to take 
part in debates leading up the social decision making and to have a say. As the 
discussion shows, these rights are limited by the rights of others, and any 
working public sphere will have to have some norms in place to coordinate the 
sequence of speaking, so that everybody with enough patience can have a go at 
presenting their points. The Principe of Free Participation also contains a 
freedom not to speak: this means that no one needs to speak if they do not choose 
to do so. One may, therefore, use the public sphere as a passive listener. It is 
plausible that in large societies with large public spheres this right not to 
intervene in person and instead follow what others have to say is a position that 
many citizens will take. 
The Principle of Listener Choice says that all participants in the public sphere may 
listen to speakers of their choice. This entails that they can direct away their 
attention from the person currently speaking to a new speaker. However, they 
can only do so at suitable times, e.g., when someone starts speaking to them they 
will normally have to wait for a suitable opportunity before they can withdraw 
from that conversation and start listening to someone else. And because the 
human ability to listen has limited bandwith, most people can normally only 
listen to one person at a time. The Principle of Listener Choice is rooted in the 
freedom of association. It enables people to pick, with some limitations, who they 
choose to pay attention to. The Principle of Listener Choice also introduces a 
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competitive element into the public sphere: speakers can attract attention to 
different degrees, as listeners can make choices to whom they want to listen 
continuously.  
Because of the Principle of Free Participation, and because the Principle of Listener 
Choice only allows to change to whom one listens ‘at suitable times’, there is no 
freedom not to hear things one does not want to hear, which is what the Principle 
of Exposure says. This means that, as long as people are present in the public 
sphere, others can choose to speak to them. The listener may end that process at 
some point, by either starting to speak, or by listening to someone else, but there 
is no right to do so immediately. Being in the public sphere entails that one can be 
subjected to unwanted speech. The only way to avoid this is to leave the public 
sphere. This limits the freedom to associate in the public sphere. However, this is 
how it ought to be – the public sphere is a place in which one may be confronted 
with views that are surprising, unsolicited, and perhaps undesired. This impinges 
on the freedom to associate, but it only does so for citizens who choose to take 
part in the public sphere. 
The Principle of Transparency comes in two parts. First, because the public sphere 
is public, each participant can observe who talks to whom.7  Second, because 
everybody has a right to listen, each participant has, in principle, the opportunity 
to access the content of speech acts. In practice, participants will be limited by 
 
7 This is briefly mentioned in Geuss 2003: 52, who attributes this thought to Diogenes. See 
also Hendricks and Hansen 2016: ch. 2. 
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their skills to follow different simultaneous conversations, of course, but that 
does not diminish the fact that all participants are permitted to observe who talks 
to whom, and about what. Transparency is difficult to make us of in its entirety if 
the number of people attending the public sphere is large. In small fora, 
everybody will naturally observe what is going on around them. In a large public 
sphere, by contrast, making sure that the connections between participants are 
transparent is a more difficult undertaking. 
Finally, the Principle of Public Sphere Scrutiny indicates the content that must 
normally be debated in the public sphere. Public scrutiny, or at least the 
opportunity to  scrutinize, I assume, is required for laws, executive acts, policies, 
public conduct, but also general matters of public interest, such as political values 
or principles. I will not spell out in detail or argue in favour of such a principle 
here (see Gosseries and Parr, 2018  for an overview; cf. Chambers, 2004). Instead, 
I simply proceed on the assumption that public scrutiny is needed for many 
public matters as a condition of political legitimacy. It may not be needed for all 
public matters because in some instances public scrutiny may be delayed, limited, 
or even waived, for instance, when publicity undermines effectiveness or 
infringes rights. It is also worth noting that the Principle of Public Sphere Scrutiny 
does not demand actual scrutiny of all acts that could be scrutinized. This is 
because the volume of public activity that falls into the domain of the public 
sphere is so large that most items cannot be scrutinized in the public sphere in 
detail. What matters, instead, is the opportunity to scrutinize if the need arises.  
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The Principle of Public Sphere Scrutiny has a function in regulating the relation 
between public sphere and private spheres.  Political deliberation can and does, 
of course, take place in private spheres: citizens debate public matters in their 
families or among friends, NGOs or political parties might strategize behind 
closed doors, and so on. Private deliberation has important functions. It may 
allow under-represented groups to speak up in protected environments, help 
minorities to develop their group views, or enable political parties to ‘brainstorm’ 
and strategize (see, e.g., Sunstein, 2000).8 Clearly, not every conversation about 
public matters needs or ought to be public at every stage of the process. However, 
democratic legitimacy normally can only be conferred onto a decision about 
public matters if there is an opportunity for public scrutiny in the public sphere at 
some point. 
The Principle of Public Sphere Scrutiny has another important upshot: anyone who 
makes proposals to change public policy and seeks legitimacy to do so will 
eventually have to make these ideas available for scrutiny in the public sphere 
and defend them there. And once one does, one will likely experience 
disagreement and arguments against the proposal. This is why the public sphere 
is competitive in pluralistic societies: the public sphere is a place of reasoned 
contestation about the direction of public policy. It therefore creates an incentive 
to present good arguments in public. 
 
8 I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point. 
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Looking at the principles together, the public sphere model may seem like one 
unified place where everyone follows the same conversation, tying all 
participants into one debate. But the model is more flexible in that regard. In fact, 
the Principles of Free Participation and Listener Choice do not rule out the 
emergence of different ‘sub-spheres’. These are groups of people that primarily 
talk among each other, and do not talk much to other sub-spheres. However, this 
effect is always limited by the opportunity for all participants to listen and talk to 
everyone. As participants compete for ideas, and ultimately for influence, 
incentives are created to listen and talk to participants beyond one’s own sub-
sphere. The important point is that, in the public sphere, sub-spheres are always 
open to new listeners and speakers, and that there are incentives to keep the 
boundaries of sub-spheres porous. Crucially, at certain moments, more unified 
conversations across sub-spheres are possible. 
This concludes our discussion of public sphere principles. It is important to note 
that the principles listed above are by no means complete. They need to be 
complemented with a wider set of norms of deliberative civility to enable a 
working deliberative exchange. For instance, deliberation cannot work without 
some further rules about when it is polite to interrupt, wider norms about 
reason-giving and justification, and norms to sanction participants that do not 
comply with the rules. For this reason, The Principle of Free Participation and the 
Principle of Listener Choice make reference to ‘suitable times’ at which people 
may change their current speaking or listening relations. This could be made 
precise in different ways, reflecting contextual norms of politeness.  
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The Functions of the Public Sphere 
The public sphere model enables us to identify four core functions of the public 
sphere: to expose to unchosen thought, to promote equality of democratic 
opportunity, to create deliberative transparency, and to create common 
knowledge. 
Exposure. Because of the Principle of Open Access, the Principle of Free 
Participation, and the Principle of Exposure, the public sphere creates a structure 
of social interaction in which citizens will be exposed to views that they cannot 
choose, likely including information and opinions that diverge from theirs 
(Sunstein, 2018: ch. 2). The effect is reinforced by the Principle of Public Sphere 
Scrutiny and the incentives it creates to persuade others: political activists trying 
to put together a majority will need to convince citizens who start with other 
viewpoints. The public sphere therefore serves as a space in which citizens will 
learn about facts that they did not know before and experience viewpoints that 
they disagree with. As many liberals have argued, the experience of a wide range 
of views is essential for epistemically successful public decision making (Mill, 
1859). The importance of exposure also shows that the public sphere is not a 
‘marketplace’, at least not in the sense that consumer choice reigns supreme. If 
citizens were to be treated like consumers, they would not be inconvenienced 
with views they disagree with. Rather, the very point of the public sphere is that 
its participants need to bear with unwanted speech. It could not be any other way 
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in a deliberative process; deliberation relies on hearing views one does not 
necessarily want to hear. 
Equality of Deliberative Opportunity. Because of the Principle of Open Access and 
the Principle of Free Participation, everyone has an opportunity to have their 
position heard in the public sphere. The setup of the public sphere provides 
everyone with the chance to have their point made, making sure that different 
viewpoints are represented. However, because ideas have ‘jointness of supply’, it 
is not necessary (nor productive) to hear the same ideas again and again. Instead, 
to express how much support each idea garners, voting is a much more efficient 
method (Christiano, 1996: 258–9). The public debate is not the space to measure 
the distribution of views, it is to make relevant facts publicly known, test and 
improve arguments, and have the orthodoxy challenged by new perspectives. 
Equality of Deliberative Opportunity therefore does not amount to equality of 
opportunity for influence. 
Deliberative Transparency. Because of the Principle of Listener Choice, the 
Principle of Transparency and the Principle of Public Sphere Scrutiny, all 
participants in the public sphere have the opportunity to observe conversations 
about public matters and are able to witness who talks to whom. The participants 
also know that other participants have similar opportunities of observation. This 
does not necessarily mean that everyone observes everything, as the human 
capacity to follow different conversations at the same time is limited. More to the 
point, the fact that everyone has a right to see who speaks to whom provides an 
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egalitarian assurance. It mitigates the fear that some privileged actors have 
‘secret knowledge’ or can make ‘secret deals’ in the process of public scrutiny. 
And, provided that the citizens see a well-functioning, diverse public sphere in 
which their interests are represented, it also counters the suspicion that some 
citizens are more influential, or their views better represented than others in the 
public sphere. 
Common Knowledge. The public sphere has another important function that is 
based on the Principles of Free Participation, Listener Choice and Transparency – 
it allows citizens to create common knowledge (Hendricks and Hansen, 2016: ch. 
2). It is useful to distinguish two terms: Mutual knowledge of a fact occurs when 
all individuals know this fact. Common knowledge requires, in addition, that all 
individuals know that all individuals know this fact, and that all individuals know 
that all individuals know that all individuals know this fact, and so on, up to 
infinity. The easiest way to create Common knowledge is by a public 
announcement, such that all individuals observe each other when they hear it.9 
The public sphere is well-suited for creating common knowledge because it is 
possible to make public announcements that are heard by everyone while, at the 
same time, everybody is observing each other listening to the announcement. Not 
all speaking acts in the public sphere are like that, of course, only those where 
one speaker manages to capture the attention of all others present in the public 
 
9 See Vanderschraaf and Sillari 2014 for a much more precise and comprehensive account. 
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sphere, unifying any sub-spheres for a moment. The option to create common 
knowledge fulfils a crucial role, even if full common knowledge is rarely achieved 
to perfection. 
The public sphere can help create common knowledge of different content, but in 
the context of this paper I am most interested in one specific type: the common 
knowledge that the participants of the public sphere can have good-faith, genuine 
political disagreements. How is such common knowledge generated? By 
observing fellow citizens having an argument in the public sphere in which the 
genuineness of their views and convictions is confirmed while disagreement 
remains. After this experience, the audience to this disagreement knows that 
there can be disagreements, they believe that disagreeing individuals can 
genuinely holds the beliefs they report (rather than being strategic or 
deliberatively provocative), and the audience knows that other audience 
members know this, know that they know, etc. 
Common knowledge about good-faith disagreement not only creates the mutual 
knowledge that there can be genuine disagreement. It also rules out wrong beliefs 
about the beliefs of others. This has two important upshots. First, the participants 
are now in a more symmetrical relation regarding their views on political 
disagreement. Second, this symmetry reduces distrust. Once there is common 
knowledge about the possibility of good-faith disagreement, all participants can 
take this as a given and move on to the question how they should deal with 
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disagreement. They stop worrying about bad-faith explanations for 
disagreement, and they also stop worrying about others worrying about that.10 
The public sphere model is not a policy prescription: its idealized principles 
cannot always be fully implemented of course. To protect the proper functioning 
of a state’s real-world public sphere, it may be necessary to temporarily restrict 
its size, restrict participation to elected representatives, or subdivide the public 
sphere into separate fora to compromise between access and meaningful 
exchange. In the same vein, it may not always be possible to guarantee that every 
citizen can speak to every other citizen; it may not always be possible for all 
citizens to personally speak to the prime minister, for example. But note that, 
even if the Principle of Free Participation cannot be fully implemented, there are 
surrogate provisions in some constitutions, such as the right to petition 
enshrined in article 17 of Germany’s basic law, ensuring that every citizen can 
direct written requests to all officials and will receive an anwer. While not 
guaranteeing an actual right to speak to everyone, it does ensure a more limited 
form of communicative access and response, preserving some of the spirit of the 
ideal principle. 
These considerations on the relation between model and real-world public 
sphere conclude the discussion of the public sphere model. Developing this model 
 
10 Just because participants in the public sphere obtain common knowledge about the 
possibility of genuine disagreement does not lead them to the conclusion that 
disagreement is always genuine. However, after experiencing genuine disagreement they 
will find it more likely that other disagreements are also genuine. 
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has been useful because it uncovered some fundamental norms of a shared space 
for public exchange. The next section applies these insights to the effects of social 
media on the public sphere. 
How Social Media Restructures the Public Sphere 
The advent of the World Wide Web gave internet activists and democratic 
theorists cause for optimism. Finally, there was a technology to connect people 
across the world, to enable the unhindered flow of information, and to break 
down local or national barriers. A great number of volunteers contributed to 
public resources, such as free and open software or online encyclopedias. A 
vibrant ‘blogosphere’ suggested new forms of deliberation. The lowering of costs 
and entrance barriers for publishing information made it much easier to make 
information accessible for a wide audience and provided users with a universe of 
information. In ‘The Wealth of Networks’, for example, Yochai Benkler (2006) 
describes the democratic potential of the internet, pointing to lower barriers and 
costs for information transmission, search and matching, easier connections and 
shorter paths between individuals, and the ability for everyone to publish and 
broadcast. 
This optimism has been dampened by a growing concern about the negative 
influence of social networks on the quality of political discourse. One telling 
example is the contrast between Benkler’s optimistic 2006 book and his more 
recent work on ‘Network Propaganda’ (Benkler et al., 2018). 
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Much communication that used to take place in the more traditional public 
sphere has migrated ‘online’, it takes place on Facebook, Twitter, and other social 
network and social messaging services.11 This is not only a change in medium, it 
is also, and arguably more importantly, a change in the structure of sender-
receiver relations.  
We can use the functions identified in the public sphere model to assess the 
changes social media makes to the public sphere. The first two functions, 
Exposure and Equality of Deliberative Opportunity, are often at the center of the 
debate, and they surely play a role. But in my view, more attention should be 
given to Deliberative Transparency and to Common Knowledge Production. In my 
view, these functions are impacted in a structurally deeper and arguably more 
important way. 
Consider first Exposure. If the public sphere fragments into many sub-networks, 
there is a risk that the exposure function is undermined (Sunstein, 2018). The 
exposure function may suffer because social networks allow for self-sorting into 
groups of like-minded people (the so-called ‘echo chamber’ effect; Bakshy et al., 
2015). A related effect is due to the social algorithms controlling who connects to 
whom, potentially leading to the creation of ‘filter bubbles’ (Pariser, 2012). 
 
11 Here I focus on Facebook and Twitter as the most influential social media platforms with 
significant social content. I ignore smaller platforms like Reddit and largely unpolitical 
services like Instagram. I only have a cursory look at closed messaging groups like 
WhatsApp, though a more comprehensive analysis should investigate their role in 
‘privatizing’ the public sphere. 
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Empirically, while there is some supporting evidence, the jury is still out whether 
these results are robust and substantive (Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2016), 
especially when looking at overall media use (Guess, forthcoming; Dubois and 
Blank, 2018). One difficulty is that much of the data needed to answer these 
questions is not publicly accessible as it is held by the platforms that need to be 
analyzed. 
We now turn to Equality of Deliberative Opportunity. Here the effect is mixed. 
Social media have substantially lowered the entry barriers for reaching large 
audiences, thereby increasing communication opportunities. At the same time, 
‘virality’ effects also come with extreme path dependency: some messages will 
reach millions, other, perhaps equally important contributions, never achieve this 
‘viral’ quality and are heard by very few. 
Deliberative Transparency, by contrast, is impacted in more fundamental ways. 
Transferring the public sphere into social media communication structures has 
undermined transparency. One reason for that is sheer volume: as the number 
and frequency of contributions increases, participants in the networked public 
sphere can only digest a small proportion of available content. Twitter, which is 
largely public, is a good example: it has dramatically increased conversation of 
public matters. Tweets are public but given that half a billion tweets are added 
every day, users need to filter, and many choose to depend on the filter 
mechanisms Twitter’s social algorithms provide. Even Twitter users highly 
focused on a specific debate (say, all tweets relating to Brexit) will have unique 
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stream reading experiences, with different users being shown different tweets 
depending on their network and other choices on the platform. Another reason 
why Deliberative Transparency is undermined is the opportunity to restrict entry 
to groups (most notably on Facebook and a default feature of messaging apps like 
WhatsApp or Instagram). This has led to a partial replacement of a public sphere 
with structures more akin to private conversation. 
Finally, Common Knowledge. Given the lack of Deliberative Transparency, creating 
common knowledge has become difficult. In the model public sphere, the 
common knowledge production was enabled because everybody who attended 
the public sphere was able to observe the proceedings and could witness not only 
the communication of others, but also that everyone witnessed this setting of 
deliberative equality. In a fragmented social media landscape, creating common 
or even just mutual knowledge of this kind has become virtually impossible. The 
structure is too decentralized for the participants to witness each other.  
The phenomenon affects common knowledge production in general, but is 
particularly problematic in relation to disagreement. Without the relevant 
knowledge, citizens will remain in a state of ignorance about the fact that the 
disagreements they observe are often based on beliefs that are formed genuinely, 
in good faith, rather than being the result of manipulation or strategic thinking. 
And without the relevant common knowledge they do not know that this 
experience is shared and that other participants have also learned from this 
observation. Experiencing disagreement while knowing that this disagreement is 
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in good faith is quite different from experiencing disagreement while believing 
that it is the result of manipulative power. The former is the first step towards 
recognition of reasonable pluralism, while the latter may be the beginning of 
conspiracy theories about nefarious elites preventing the ‘will of the people’ from 
emerging. It can also lead to a ‘delegitimation’ of democracy by portraying 
opposing voices as enemies (Muirhead and Rosenblum, 2019: 35). The most 
plausible response to the genuine disagreement is to rationally deliberate and 
seek to bridge differences, while the response to suspected conspiracy may well 
be an unravelling of trust between citizens and an increasingly ‘paranoid style’ of 
politics. 
The importance of creating common knowledge about genuine disagreement is 
not widely acknowledged in the literature, as most attention has been given to 
the reduction in exposure that social media is suspected to cause.12 It is unclear, 
however, whether more news personalization leads to less exposure to diverse 
opinions. The empirical evidence on this question is mixed, as we have seen. The 
change of perspective I propose is fundamental. When looking through the prism 
of exposure, the relations put into relief are dyadic: exposure is promoted if there 
are more dyads of individuals disagreeing with each. But when considering 
common knowledge of genuine disagreement, the relevant relations to be 
 
12 Even Hendricks and Hansen 2016, who appear to be the first to recognize that social 




considered go beyond the interest in dyads: required are, at the minimum, two 
individuals showing genuine disagreement, an audience observing this 
disagreement, and the audience observing each other observing this 
disagreement. 
Once the audience has obtained the common knowledge that genuine 
disagreement is possible, and that all audience members know that genuine 
disagreement is possible, and so on, the relation between audience members is 
transformed: with the possibility of genuine disagreement observed and 
commonly acknowledged, they are now much more likely to respect 
disagreement with each other. And they are less likely to fall for the populist 
narrative that disagreement is the work of dark forces to occlude the ‘general 
will’. Common knowledge of genuine disagreement is a core feature to make 
diverse citizens relate in civil ways. 
Populism and Social Media 
How can a well-working public sphere keep populism in check? I focus on two 
thoughts. First, the doubt that a well-working public sphere can instill regarding 
the claim that there is a ‘general will’ in the sense the populist suggests: a natural 
consent that is covered up by nefarious forces. Second, the role that transparency 
and common knowledge can play in defusing elite conspiracy theories. Taken 
from this perspective, fighting populism is an epistemic challenge – what needs to 
be tackled are the false beliefs that underpin it. 
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We have seen above that a central premise of the populist narrative is the 
existence of the ‘will of the people’. There are several reasonable positions one 
could take on this matter: some might think that the ‘will of the people’ exists or 
can be brought into existence as a matter of deliberative construction 
(Richardson, 2002). Others might think that some public judgements can be 
correct or incorrect according to objective standards. Yet others, committed to a 
preference aggregation framework, point out that the will of the people is at best 
a contingent construct – contingent on the choice of aggregation procedures, all of 
which come with distinct drawbacks. This paper is not the place to adjudicate 
between these positions. What matters for present purposes is that no plausible 
analysis suggests that the populist has special epistemic access to the ‘will of the 
people’ and can successfully identify it where others fail.  
It now becomes apparent why the communication structures provided by social 
networks are so conducive to populism. First, because social media tends to 
reduce the Deliberative Transparency of the public sphere, it is easier to form a 
skewed view of how preferences or opinions are distributed across society. If 
most of your social media peers agree with you, and only more remote relations 
disagree, it is easier to assume that there is (near) consensus. Moreover, once you 
realize that there is less agreement than you expected, the ‘bad faith’ hypothesis 
kicks in: since all your peers are very reasonable people and agree on something, 
surely all those with other opinions must be misguided, mistaken, deluded, or 
acting in bad faith. This set of beliefs, that others are either incompetent or acting 
in bad faith, is hard to refute if your interactions with disagreeing others remain 
33 
 
superficial. It takes dissent from persons you respect to create doubts about the 
bad faith and incompetence hypothesis. 
To learn that one can reasonably disagree about the public good (or even what 
the so-called ‘will of the people’ is) takes frequent experiences of dissent from 
people whose views one values. This is why a well-working public sphere is so 
valuable for democracy: it creates a conversation about the public good in which 
everyone can observe genuine disagreement. 
The insight that disagreement is mostly genuine, a product of the basic fact of 
pluralism, does not come naturally. It is something that needs to be learned and 
requires frequent reminders. Very few institutions can provide these reminders: 
elections, for example, can show disagreement but they do not show why people 
disagree and therefore cannot falsify the bad faith hypothesis. Unstructured local 
deliberation does not work either because citizens might self-select like-minded 
peers and fail to see that their peers are not representative. Deliberation on social 
media might not work that well for similar reasons. 
What can work is public deliberation, organized in a way that makes the 
exchange of reasons open for everyone to follow. The important point here is not 
active participation. The important point is to see genuine disagreement 
emerging in discussion, demonstrating to everyone listening that there are 
several reasonable positions, each finding support. Merely listening to such a 
debate in the public sphere will have the required effect, regardless of whether 
one actively contributes. In fact, less can be more for this purpose: it is better for 
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everyone to follow the proceedings of one well-working public sphere than 
society splitting into many sealed-off spheres, where information about what is 
going on in the other public spheres is limited. To fight populism, the most 
important function of the public sphere is to demonstrate to everyone that 
genuine disagreement is the normal state of affairs. 
As we have seen, populists rely on anti-elitism, which is propped up by the belief 
that there is a powerful elite, acting in secret, conspiring against the people. The 
resentment on which populists draw is fed by this assumption of secret control 
and domination. In this respect the communication structures of social media are 
perfect for the populist. With public debate happening in so many different 
virtual locations, many of which have closed access, the populist narrative can 
thrive because (i) it is hard to follow what others are saying and therefore 
difficult to refute the elite conspiracy theory; (ii) it is hard to observe the 
communication structures that evolve and therefore difficult to rule out the 
existence of secret cliques with high levels of influence; (iii) it is hard to create 
common knowledge and therefore difficult to fight situations of distrust; (iv) It is 
hard to find evidence that citizens have good-faith, genuine disagreements and to 
create a setting of mutual epistemic trust in light of these disagreements. 
The upshot of this discussion is that social media tends to restructure the public 
sphere in ways that makes it difficult to challenge the beliefs a populist ideology 
relies on. Without a well-working public sphere, the populist’s anti-elitist and 




In this paper, I have suggested one plausible link between populism and social 
media: that social media tends to undermine the central functions of the public 
sphere, and thereby enables the success of populists. This short paper cannot 
offer a comprehensive analysis, but I hope it will motivate political theorists to 
revisit the public sphere and its functions, and political scientists to turn these 
early musings into an empirical research program. 
The central epistemic challenge in order to refute populism is to show that 
modern societies experience genuine good faith disagreements. A decentralized 
social media structure makes it much harder for citizens to arrive at this 
conclusion by observation. Changing central structural features of the public 
sphere comes with significant risks – we should therefore question whether 
social media platforms should be allowed to do this without careful investigation 
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